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Goede le  De Keersmaeker 
Is the world becoming multipolar or will 
it remain unipolar? Analysts disagree, 
but it might be that this does not matter 
too much and that we better skip polarity 
terminology altogether. 
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Indeed, ever since the Neo-conservative 
Charles Krauthammer coined the term ‘the 
unipolar moment’ in 1990, there has been a 
whole school of thought in the United States 
that describes the world in terms of a lasting 
American unipolarity, if not hegemony.1 
Admittedly in the United States too there were 
authors who claimed that this unipolar 
moment would not last long, or has simply 
never been there. Yet the difference is striking: 
many Americans think the world is unipolar, 
and the rest of the world thinks it is or is 
becoming multipolar. 
 
Now, one could argue that American 
unipolarists are just a bunch of ivory tower 
university professors, but that is too easy an 
argument, given the intellectual calibre of 
many of the participants in the debate and the 
sophistication of their arguments. Moreover, 
though both the Clinton and the G. W. Bush 
administrations avoided explicit references to 
unipolarity or hegemony, their foreign and 
defence policies (though very different in 
outlook) started from the same premise of 
American dominance. It was only under 
Obama that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
mentioned an evolution towards ‘a multipolar 
world and towards a multi-partner world.’2 But 
here too, the differences with the world views 
of the former administrations might be less 
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It is quite common in EU circles in Brussels to 
describe the current world order as multipolar. 
Even the European institutions themselves in 
their official statements from time to time 
refer to multipolarity or at least to an evolution 
towards a more multipolar world. They are not 
the only ones. Multipolarity has been a 
recurrent ingredient of Chinese foreign policy 
discourse since the late 1980s. In Russia, 
despite all the differences between the Yeltsin 
and Putin reigns, they have one thing in 
common: the promotion of multipolarity as a 
central goal of Russian foreign policy. BRIC-
countries like to refer to a multipolar world in 
their summit statements and thus it is also 
present in EU partnership declarations with 
these countries. 
 
So one might conclude that all major world 
players agree that the international system is 
becoming multipolar or is already, if it were 
not for some American academics who 
continue to claim that the world is unipolar 
and will remain so for some time.  
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than one might think at first glance, for even 
the current administration stresses the need 
for American leadership and the fact that the 
United States will continue to remain the 
strongest nation in the world. 
 
So if the American unipolarists are right, the 
multipolarists in the rest of the world must be 
wrong. However, European and Asian 
politicians and commentators are not less 
intelligent than their American counterparts. If 
they talk about multipolarity they must have 
good reasons. In official statements, wording 
is subject to detailed negotiations and 
compromise between participants. It is not by 
mere nonchalance that multipolarity is used or 
omitted.  
 
So who is right? Are we confronted with a 
‘Unipolar Fantasy’ as one author claimed, or 
with a ‘Multipolar Myth’ as another stated?3 I 
argue that both sides are right because they 
speak about different things. At the same time, 
I claim they might both be wrong because 
polarity does not help much in describing and 
analysing the complex international situation 
we face today.  
 
BACK TO THE COLD WAR 
Polarity left a deep imprint on how academics 
think about international relations. Every 
undergraduate who takes just a short 
introductory course on international relations 
theory knows that for the Neo-realist school, 
polarity – that is the number of great powers – 
is the central structuring element of the 
international system. It is the factor that 
defines how interaction between great powers 
develops, how mechanisms like ‘the balance of 
power’ and the ‘security dilemma’ function.  
 
But polarity has never been a purely academic 
concept. It was already around for several 
decades before Neo-realism emerged as the 
dominant school in American international 
relations theory. The term ‘bipolarity’ was used 
from 1945 onwards to describe the new 
situation that emerged from the Second World 
War. It was widely used by politicians, political 
commentators and academics alike. In this 
broader non-academic sense, bipolarity was 
closely linked to the term Cold War. After 
World War Two the world had become 
bipolar, so it was said, and that was a 
completely different situation from the one 
before 1945. As Wagner put it: ‘One reason 
why the concept of bipolarity has seemed 
meaningful to many people in spite of its 
ambiguities and contradictions is that it 
conforms to their intuition that there was 
something special about the distribution of 
power among states after World War Two.’4 
 
But what was so special about this post-World 
War Two period? What did people mean when 
they called it bipolar? In fact, as is so often the 
case, they meant several things at the same 
time. 
 
Firstly, there were two superpowers, which 
were much more powerful than the other 
states, even than other, residual great powers, 
such as France and Great Britain. 
 
Secondly, there were not only two 
superpowers but also two blocs usually 
referred to as East and West. This was about 
more than just two alliances. In history there 
have been many periods when two alliances 
confronted each other, for example, on the eve 
of the First World War. What made the 
situation after 1945 really unique was the 
combination of two opposing military alliances 
within two opposing blocs of states with 
different types of society, economic systems, 
etc.  
 
Thirdly, the situation was profoundly 
polarized. It was difficult to remain neutral, to 
find a third way between the West and the 
East. Every conflict anywhere on the globe 
was seen as part of a worldwide contest. So 
was every domain of human activity: military, 
economic, social and cultural, even personal. 
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Bipolarity was not just about military 
confrontation or commercial competition. It 
was about a profound ideological clash over 
how society should be organized. It was about 
the Cold War, a deeply bipolarized situation. 
 
Finally, bipolarity was about the bipolar 
nuclear arms race between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Though the bipolar 
confrontation was an all-inclusive 
phenomenon, it was at the same time highly 
militarized and nuclearized. 
 
All these different aspects emerged in the same 
short period of time, between 1944 (the end 
phase of World War Two) and 1950 (the 
Korean War). Except for the nuclear arms race 
(but not nuclear weapons and deterrence as 
such) all these elements also disappeared in a 
similarly short period between March 1985 
(Gorbachev taking office) and December 1991 
(the end of the Soviet Union).  
 
At that point bipolarity was clearly over: that is 
the one thing unipolarists and multipolarists 
agree about. They differ, however, on what 
was the most important change that happened.  
 
TALKING ABOUT DIFFERENT THINGS 
When discussing the new, so-called ‘post-Cold 
War’ situation, unipolarists and multipolarists 
emphasize different things. 
 
For unipolarists the most important change 
was the disappearance of the Soviet Union. As 
two minus one makes one, the United States 
became the only superpower and thus the 
world became unipolar. Multipolarists do not 
deny that the world became unipolar after 
1990, but they consider it a temporary 
phenomenon. New powers are rising or will do 
so in the future. Unipolarists do not deny this 
but claim it will take a long time before any 
other power will be able to challenge the 
United States. In fact, much of the academic 
uni/multipolar debate has been dominated by 
a rather fruitless discussion of how long 
unipolarity will last. 
 
Secondly, unipolarists neglect the huge impact 
the disappearance of the East–West divide had 
on world politics. This is partly due to an 
almost exclusive focus on military affairs, and 
from that perspective they are of course right: 
the American alliance system remained intact 
and even expanded to encompass Eastern 
Europe. American military dominance is 
undisputed and it will remain so for some time. 
Multipolarists, on the contrary, take a broader 
and more sophisticated view. By multipolarity 
they mean that the East–West bloc system is 
no longer there, that economic, financial and 
commercial, cultural and ideological relations 
are structured in a much more complex way. 
Alignments and coalitions are no longer 
automatically formed according to the great 
contradiction between the two opposing 
systems, but can change according to the 
domain (economic, military) and the issue at 
stake. This pattern was as typical of the 
multipolar nineteenth century as it is in the 
post-Cold War. American power is much 
bigger than the rest but this does not imply 
that everybody follows the American lead 
without posing questions. To put it another 
way: multipolarists speak about influence and 
interaction between states; unipolarists speak 
about mere material, and above all military, 
power. 
 
This brings us to the third point. Some 
American unipolarists do use a broader 
approach than just a focus on military 
capabilities. But in that case they see the United 
States as the inventor of democracy, free trade 
and market economy. Such a view of world 
history and the development of Western values 
(surely distorted to French and British eyes) 
leads to the idea that it was the United States, 
not the West as a whole, let alone the people of 
the former Soviet bloc, that ‘won’ the Cold 
War. Unipolarists do not realize that the end of 
 4 
the ideological bipolarization gives much more 
freedom to individual states – even if they share 
US world views – to pursue their own interests 
and insights in world politics. When Western 
European multipolarists, especially the French, 
speak about multipolarity, they also mean this 
larger freedom of action, and not feeling obliged 
to follow an American lead unconditionally. 
 
Nobody seems to pay much attention to the 
fourth element: nuclear weapons. Unipolarists 
and multipolarists apparently agree that they are 
no longer an important element in great power 
relations. This is remarkable, given the centrality 
of nuclear weapons in the Cold War East–West 
confrontation. Yet there is no reason why 
nuclear deterrence should no longer play its role 
in the current situation. More than any reference 
to unipolarity or multipolarity, it might, for 
example, explain a great deal about how the 
Georgian and Ukrainian crises have been dealt 
with, in comparison with, for example, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait.  
 
Finally, unipolar and multipolar discourses are 
normative. Unipolarists are influenced by 
hegemonic thinking and believe the world is 
better off when there is one world leader 
providing stability and guidance. Therefore 
Americans should try to turn unipolarity into a 
lasting feature of international relations. By 
contrast, multipolarity is depicted as a recipe for 
instability and dangerous great power 
confrontation. Former Foreign Secretary 
Condoleeza Rice evaluated multipolarity as 
follows: ‘The reality is that “multi-polarity” was 
never a unifying idea, or a vision. It was a 
necessary evil that sustained the absence of war 
but it did not promote the triumph of peace. 
Multipolarity is a theory of rivalry; of competing 
interests and – at its worst – competing values.’5 
 
By contrast, for multipolarists, unipolarity leads 
to instability and irresponsible and unbalanced 
behaviour, whereas multipolarity leads to 
stability. The former French president Jacques 
Chirac, a strong promoter of multipolarity, saw 
it as an alternative to chaotic great power 
struggles: ‘Contre le chaos politique qui résulterait du 
jeu aveugle des rivalités internationales, la France 
s’emploie à construire un monde multipolaire.’6 
Moreover, the argument goes, the fact that the 
United States is the biggest (military) power 
does not mean that it has the right to lead the 
world alone. Other powers should have a say 
on how the world is run. In his infamous 
speech at the 2007 Munich Security 
Conference, Putin said unipolarity was 
‘without moral foundations for modern 
civilisation.’7 
 
To summarize, some people believe the world 
is unipolar and that this is a good thing. So the 
United States should do everything to prolong 
the immediate post-Cold War situation. 
Others, however, are not convinced of the 
moral benefits of unipolarity, but also believe 
that, luckily, it will not last too long. So the 
best policy is to stimulate the evolution 
towards a more balanced multipolar situation. 
 
WHY WE SHOULD FORGET ABOUT 
POLARITY 
Given the confusion surrounding the concept, 
polarity is remarkably persistent. This might be 
because it functions as a shorthand for where 
you stand in the debate on the American 
position in the world. Do you believe the 
United States is still the predominant power, 
the only real military, economic, financial and 
ideological leader of the world? Declare 
yourself a unipolarist. Or are you instead 
convinced that the world is far too complex 
and diverse for talking of American 
predominance, and that the United States has 
no carte blanche to run the world on its own? 
Call yourself a multipolarist. 
 
Yet apart from the vagueness and confusion, 
there are plenty of other arguments against 
using polarity at all. 
  
Firstly, it is clearly self-serving. It is no accident 
that most unipolarists are found in the United 
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States, or that an official multipolar discourse is 
found in the BRIC-countries. Such countries 
usually see themselves as actual or potential 
‘poles’. By using a multipolarity discourse they at 
least partially want to promote their own 
influence, position, and status as great powers. 
Russia is the example par excellence of this self-
serving use of multipolarity. Just as many 
American unipolarists, whether or not of a Neo-
conservative stamp, implicitly or explicitly want 
to promote American interests, world views and 
indeed raw power.  
 
Secondly, just because polarity is so often used 
in an ideological, self-serving way, it might upset 
people. This is especially true for Europeans. 
Admittedly, several partners in the EU 
partnerships agreement are devoted to 
multipolarity, and so it is normal that the word 
pops up in declarations of these partnerships. 
But David Scott has pointed out that there is no 
real consensus between European Member 
States as to whether multipolarity should be a 
foreign policy goal of the EU.8 This is related to 
differences of opinion on American–European 
relations but also to differences on the future of 
the EU as a traditional great power, especially in 
the military sense. Lack of consensus is then 
covered by putting the accent on multilateralism, 
on which both supporters and opponents of 
multipolarism can agree. 
 
Our point however is this: why use the polarity 
terminology at all? Most of the time you do not 
need it to make your point. For example, there is 
no need at all to refer to multipolarity if you’re 
pleading for a stronger Common Security and 
Defence Policy. You can easily argue that in the 
present complex situation – even unipolarists do 
not really deny this complexity – there is a need 
for Europe to take more responsibility for its 
own security and defence, and that more 
cooperation is needed. Similarly, we should not 
forget that both the Clinton and the G. W. Bush 
administrations avoided any reference to 
unipolarity or hegemony, but they were both 
convinced that the United States was the 
dominant world power and they wanted to 
keep it that way.  
 
Take the French–American row over the 2003 
intervention in Iraq. Chirac’s multipolar 
rhetoric in defending his opposition to the 
intervention became the target of anti-French 
arguments and led to furious remarks about 
the dangers of multipolarity from American 
policymakers, like Rice’s quote above. In an 
interview, Tony Blair called Chirac’s vision of 
multipolarity dangerous.9 The whole dispute 
was of course primarily rhetorical, hiding what 
was really at stake: a different evaluation of the 
situation in Iraq, and to a lesser extent, 
diverging attitudes towards NATO and 
European Security and Defence Policy. 
 
Last but not least, the problem with the 
polarity literature is that it does not help us to 
explain military, diplomatic and economic 
developments. If you look back to the 
nineteenth century, you might say that it was 
multipolar as there were at least five great 
powers. Even this statement needs some 
qualification, as there were important 
differences in power between them. But 
multipolarity does not explain much about the 
evolution of the balance of power between 
these powers, or about the profound social, 
technological, ideological and geopolitical 
changes and challenges that were so typical of 
that era. Multipolarity was one of the factors 
that made crisis management difficult in the 
run up to the First World War. It is the 
example par excellence for those who believe 
multipolarity is unstable. But multipolarity was 
certainly not the only factor, and probably not 
the most important one. Moreover, polarity 
theory does not explain why the hundred years 
since the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
witnessed hardly any wars between the great 
powers. 
 
Similarly, a recent reader on the contemporary 
effects of unipolarity, with contributions from 
the most outstanding Neo-realist scholars, 
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most of them unipolarists, surprisingly 
concludes that unipolarity does not provide a 
sufficient explanation for most of the cases 
discussed in the volume.10 Indeed, it does not 
explain American failure in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the refusal of Germany and France 
to join the 2003 invasion, the rise of Islamic 
jihad, the growing influence of China in Asia, or 
the helplessness of the United States towards a 
left-populist regime in Venezuela. Likewise 
many studies that start from a multipolar 
standpoint do not explain how the rise of new 
great powers actually affects international 
relations. Usually they are reduced to some kind 
of SWOT analysis of the existing and rising 
powers, with some experts discussing individual 
states, combined with the eternal question of 
whether the EU should be considered a great 
power.11 Unipolarists usually give a negative 
answer to the last question, most multipolarists a 
qualified positive one. 
 
However, even unipolarists do not deny that 
the EU has an important role in some areas 
(though not a military one) and that new 
powers, in particular China, are growing in 
importance. Apart from those who are 
completely taken in by narrow-minded 
hegemonic fantasies, everybody agrees the 
world is much more complex than it was 
during the Cold War, and though the United 
States still has a preponderant influence, it 
cannot run the world alone. So the difference 
between unipolarists and multipolarists is not 
really profound. What we witnessed in 1985–
1991 was not the ‘end of history’, it was the 
‘end of Cold War history’. Now ‘history as 
usual’ is back. Some call that multipolarity, 
others unipolarity. It does not matter. Reality is 
stronger than this kind of simplistic 
classification. 
 
Dr. Goedele  De Keersmaeker i s  a researcher 
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